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The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities
Regulation: A Brief Review
By ALISON GREY ANDERSON*
O N February 23, 1973 the Chairman-Designate of the Securities
and Exchange Commission predicted in a speech before the Practicing
Law Institute of Washington, D.C. that "the next few years will pro-
duce very fundamental changes in the disclosure process . . . . [be-
cause] [tihe disclosure process must make more sense."' The novice
in the field of federal securities regulation might wonder why such a
basic goal as a disclosure process that "makes sense" remains a hope
rather than an achievement four decades after the enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
basic disclosure statutes administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.2 Indeed, even securities commentators have expressed
the same wonder and have recently questioned the logic of the disclo-
sure process.8
* Acting Professor of Law, University of Califorma, Los Angeles. B.A., Rad-
cliffe College, 1965; J.D., Umversity of Califorma, Berkeley, 1968.
1. Address by SEC Chairman-Designate Cook, Practicing Law Institute Program
entitled "The SEC Speaks Again," February 23, 1973, m [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. RPi. 79,229, at 82,700 [hereinafter cited as Address by SEC Chair-
man-Designate Cook]. The Securities and Exchange Commission will be referred to
as "the commission" throughout this article.
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to
from time to time as 1933 Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78hh-1 (1970) [hereinafter referred to from time to time as 1934 Act].
3, See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Truth in Securities]; Knpke, The Myth of the Informed Layman,
28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973); Knpke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Myths]; Mann, Prospec-
tuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permit-
ting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 222 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Prospectuses];
Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 254
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Soft Information]; Conference on Codification of the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Codification Con-
ference]. Economists as well as lawyers have written critically about the disclosure
process. See Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclo-
sure Requirements, m ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGuLATiON OF CoRpoRATE SEcuRr-
[311]
Critics inside and outside the commission allege that current dis-
closure policies not only fail to achieve satisfactorily their stated pur-
pose of enabling "investors to evaluate the securities of com-
pames on an informed and realistic basis" but even seem to put bar-
riers in the path of the investor seeking information. 4  This criticism
is based on the current disclosure policies excluding highly material in-
formation, like projections, from disclosure documents, while requir-
ing that included information be stated in such a negative manner as to
be possibly misleading. 5 Criticism is further aroused by the prospec-
tus, the main disclosure document, viewed by many as a composite
of meaningless boilerplate, exaggerated disclaimers, and useless visual
aids. Financial statements in the prospectus are too complex to be
understood by the average investor but not sufficiently comparable to
facilitate sophisticated investment analysis.6 Moreover, the rules de-
fimng the occasions on which these disclosures must be made are criti-
cized as almost deliberately vague, with the occasions themselves often
seeming to have been selected by the commission without regard for
the investor's need for information.'
Although this critical commentary on disclosure is widely accept-
ed, it coexists, paradoxically, with a parallel consensus that the com-
mission's disclosure policies have contributed substantially to the
TIES 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:
An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act o1 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REV. 132
(1973); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
But see Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in Ec-
ONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 185 (H. Marne ed.
1969).
4. "A basic purpose of the Federal securities laws is to provide disclosure of
material financial and other information on companies seeking to raise capital through
the public offering of their securities, as well as companies whose securities are already
publicly held. This aims at enabling investors to evaluate the securities of these com-
panies on an informed and realistic basis." 38 SEC ANN. REP 23 (1972). As this
article will discuss, the goal of an "informed and realistic" evaluation of securities by
investors includes not only sophisticated and accurate investment analysis to identify
the most desirable investments but also the effective communication to the unsophis-
ticated investor of the risks involved in securities transactions m general and the special
risk factors accompanying a particular security.
5. Knpke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 634-35; Pro-
spectuses, supra note 3, at 225; Soft Information, supra note 3, at 264-68.
6. See Knpke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973);
Panel Discussion, Neiv Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28
Bus. LAw 505, 528 (1973) (remarks of H. Marsh, Jr. on visual aids); Soft Informa-
tion, supra note 3, at 267-68.
7 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 152, 168 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT
REPORT]; Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at 1349.
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strength of the American securities markets. 8  This paradoxical view
exists in part because of uncertainty about both the specific goals of
the disclosure process and their relative priorities. 9 Much of the re-
cent critical commentary on the commission's disclosure policies seems
to proceed from the implicit assumption that the primary, or even the
sole, purpose of the current disclosure process is to facilitate the kind
of investment analysis which will enable sophisticated investors to
make the best possible choice among competing investment oppor-
tunities." As noted above, some of the commission's current disclo-
sure policies seem inconsistent with that purpose. It is clear, how-
ever, that the commission has traditionally been at least equally con-
cerned with using disclosure to protect investors, especially unsophis-
ticated investors, from fraud and from more subtle forms of exploita-
tion.:1
8. See, e.g., Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Mar-
kets, in EcoNoMIc PoLICY AN THE REGULATION OF CORORATE SEcuamus 185, 195,
198-99 (H. Manne ed. 1969). 38 SEC ANN. REP. xxv (1972); Wheat, The Philosophy
and Policies of the SEC's Disclosure Policy Study, m PLI 1st ANN. INST. ON SEc.
REG. 18 (1970).
9. Compare Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regula-
tion, 16 Bus. LAw. 300, 300 (1961) ("The Securities Act is essentially a legislative
device to obtain certain basic information essential to an investment analysis."), with
Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 43, 43
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Knauss] ("The initial justification for the Federal Securi-
ties Acts was to protect the investor from fraud. ... Investor protection is still 'num-
ber one' m the hierarchy of reasons for government regulation of disclosure. ").
Compare Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132, 134 (1973) (required dis-
closure necessary for fair and efficient operation of capital markets), with Ferber, The
Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REv. 621,
622 (1970) ("Since I believe Congress was attempting to improve the morality of the
marketplace, I think that the economic effect is largely irrelevant. "), and Manning,
Discussion and Comments on Papers by Professor Demsetz and Professor Benston, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SEcuarriEs 81, 84-85, 87 (H.
Marine ed. 1969) (securities regulation inspired by neither efficiency nor fraud prob-
lems, but rather by the "ethical-political problem" of relations between corporate man-
agement and corporate investors).
There was little discussion of the reasons for adopting a disclosure approach to
securities regulation when the original legislation was enacted in 1933. Knauss, A Re-
appraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 613-15 (1964). Partly
as a result, many securities lawyers concurred with A.A. Sommer, Jr., when he stated
in reference to the securities laws: "I think all of us have had a long lurking convic-
tion that we are dealing with concepts, ideas, and propositions that perhaps were lack-
ing sufficient theoretical underpinnings." Sommer, Discussion and Comments on Pa-
pers by Professor Demsetz and Professor Benston, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TIM REG-
ULATION OF CORPORATE SEcuRITES 88 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
10. See Myths, supra note 3, at 1165-69; Prospectuses, supra note 3, at 224-27.
11. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) [hereinafter cited as S.
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Although the theoretical assumptions underlying the use of dis-
closure as a regulatory device may not have been adequately ex-
plored, the dual function of disclosure-promoting accurate investment
analysis and protecting unsophisticated investors from unfair treat-
ment-has always been implicitly recognized. 12  On the one hand, dis-
closure makes available the information needed for accurate invest-
ment analysis, thus promoting efficient securities markets which in
turn result in better allocation of the nation's capital resources. 3
Conversely, as a protective device, disclosure prevents the kind of de-
frauding and exploitation of inexperienced investors which depends for
its success on nondisclosure, or inadequate or misleading disclosure,
by securities dealers or corporate insiders.' 4 Furthermore, disclosure
indirectly encourages those in the securities industry and the corporate
world to adhere to higher standards of conduct.' 5
Any attempt to identify particular disclosure requirements as sole-
ly "informational" or solely "protective" in their impact must neces-
sarily be fruitless, since most disclosure required by the commission
promotes, to a greater or lesser degree, all the purposes mentioned
above. The emphasis which the current spate of criticism places on
the informational purpose of disclosure, however, suggests that a re-
view is warranted of the role which protective disclosure has played in
REP No. 471; Knauss, supra note 9; Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORD. L. REV. 565, 575-76 (1972).
12. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIsSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at
1 (1963); Knauss, supra note 9, at 43-44. Because most disclosure furthers both pur-
poses, the commission rarely distinguishes between the two purposes but sunply refers
to disclosure as promoting "informed and realistic" decisions by investors. E.g., 38
SEC ANN. REP. 23 (1972). In its early years, the commission was more apt to empha-
size the antifraud aspects of disclosure requirements, describing them as intended "to
place adequate and true information before the investor and to prevent the sale of se-
curities through misrepresentation-perhaps the only way m which fraudulent secun-
ties can be sold to the public." 1 SEC ANN. REP. 27 (1935).
13. See Knauss, supra note 9, at 43-44; Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between
Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORD. L. REv. 565, 576-77
(1972).
14. See H.R. REP No. 85, 73d Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 85]; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1383]; E. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT
AND THE S.E.C. 299 (1948) [hereinafter cited as E. MCCORMICK]. Aside from deter-
nng fraudulent schemes, public disclosure also protects investors by equalizing the ac-
cess to relevant information of the small investor and the market professional or cor-
porate insider. V BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 716-17 (1972).
15. See V BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 717 (1972); WHEAT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 10, 50-51, Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORD. L. REv. 565, 577-78 (1972).
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the development of the disclosure process. Thus, this article de-
scribes the origins of the commission's concern with protective dis-
closure and suggests that the commission's initial emphasis on use of
disclosure in a protective fashion, with generally approved results, is
at least partly responsible for those aspects of the current disclosure
process wlich, measured against the goal of providing useful invest-
ment information, are now seen as illogical or even counterproductive.
The article concludes that the commission's recent attempts to develop
a disclosure process primarily aimed at providing useful investment
information reflects a shift in the commission's attitude toward the
proper role of disclosure. It must always be kept in mind, however,
that increasing the informational value of disclosure is not simply a
matter of stamping out illogical disclosure requirements, but rather,
of resolving conflicts between policies intended to protect the unwary in-
vestor, on the one hand, and policies designated to increase information
available to sophisticated investors on the other.
The Origins and Functions of the Disclosure Process
The basic disclosure program of the commission is usually con-
sidered to be based on the Securities Act of 1933 and the disclosure
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16 These statutes
16. Cf. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 3; Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at
1341-42. The commission has recently been attempting to create a single, coherent
disclosure system by coordinating or "integrating" the provisions of the two statutes.
Address by SEC Chairman Cook, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, April 19,
1973, in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,341, at 83,025. In addition, the American Law
Institute is currently engaged m a project to codify all the federal securities laws, com-
bining the disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts into a single disclosure
process. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972; Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973);
Loss & Blackstone, Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 Bus. LAw. 381
(1973).
Disclosure provisions in fact appear m all the statutes administered by the com-
mission. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, § 313, 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12,
13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1970); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 9,
15 U.S.C. § 78iii (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §§ 4, 5, 15
U.S.C. §§ 79d, 79e (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
8 (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203, 205, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, 80b-
4 (1970). In addition to the seven statutes which it administers, the commission has
advisory responsibility with respect to chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§
501-676 (1970). The pervasive role of disclosure in the regulatory scheme is noted
in an oft-quoted statement by Louis Loss:
"Then too, there is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure,
again disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But
'the truth shall make you free."' 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrras REGULATiON 21 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
were enacted primarily to prevent the recurrence of those abuses in
the securities markets which were regarded as partially responsible for
the October 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent depression. 17
Thus, the overriding concern of Congress in passing the legislation
was to provide protection for small investors, many of whom had lost
their savings by investing m the securities markets in the late twenties
and early thirties.1 s
The Historical Background
In the general prosperity of the late 1920s the relatively unsoph-
isticated small scale investors entered the stock market in substantial
numbers for the first time. 9 Their participation in the market was
encouraged by the securities industry through newly developed dis-
tribution techniques, aggressive advertising and promotional campaigns,
increasing numbers of securities salesmen using high pressure sales tac-
tics, and public promotion of the practice of buying securities on mar-
gin.20  The resulting increase in demand for securities, along with the
general economic conditions, meant rising stock prices, which in turn
meant further increasing numbers of investors. This increase succeeded
in driving stock prices up even higher and supported public expecta-
tions that "the price of securities would indefimtely advance."'2' The
price of securities did not "indefinitely advance," of course, and the
October 1929 stock market crash followed by deep market declines re-
sulted in enormous real and paper losses to individual investors.--
Widely publicized hearings conducted by the Senate from 1932 to
1934 provided evidence of unethical and fraudulent conduct on the
part of many investment bankers and corporate promoters during the
17 Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 216-17 (1959).
18. See H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 1-3; S. REP No. 47, supra note
11, Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 613
(1964).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 14, at 3-4; V CAROSSO, INVESTMENT
BANKING IN AMERICA 249-50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT BANKING]; James,
The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624, 629 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
James].
20. See H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 2-3; INVESTMENT BANKING, supra
note 19, at 250, 252, 253-54; E. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 19. See generally I.
GALBRArrI, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929 (1954).
21. INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 253 (quoting Secretary of the Treas-
ury Mellon); see id. at 240.
22. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 2-3; INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note
19, at 306.
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late twenties and early thirties, including outright manipulation of
stock prices, the taking of excessive promotional profits, and multiple
conflicts of interest and self-dealing.2" Underwriters, faced with the
insatiable public demand for securities, had abandoned traditional
standards of banking judgment and ethics. They urged corporations
to undertake new issues even when they needed no additional capital
and knowingly sold highly speculative or fraudulent securities to un-
sophisticated investors.24 Such behavior by members of the invest-
ment community was regarded as "unscrupulous exploitation of public
gullibility and avarice."25
The specific instances of fraud and unethical behavior were seen
by many reformers and commentators as merely one aspect of a broad-
er problem affecting both the financial community and the corporate
world.20 Writers like Louis D. Brandeis and Adolf A. Berle had pub-
licized the view that neither the members of the financial community
nor those who managed large public corporations were subject to ef-
fective controls m the interest of the investing public.17  This lack
of control left the investing public with no remedy for resulting losses
when such individuals, theoretically trustees with respect to the inves-
tors whose money they controlled, failed to abide by fiduciary stand-
ards, as they frequently did.2" Furthermore, since the major part of
the securities business was interstate and not subject to state control,
23. Heanngs on S. 14 and S. 56, Stock Exchange Practices, Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d and 73d Congs., 1st and 2d Sess. (1932-34); see
INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 322-51. See generally F PECoRA, WALL
STREET UNDER OATri (1939). Press coverage of the hearings is described m R. DE
BEDTs, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMAT=VE YEARS 17-24 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
R. DE BEDTS].
24. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 2-3; E. McCoRmIcK, supra note 14, at
19; Gourrich, Investment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the Securities Act of
1933, 4 L. & CoNTEmP. PnoB. 44, 52 (1937); see M. PARRIsH, SEcuRIIES REGLATION
AND THE NEw DEAL 31-34, 75 (1970) [hereinafter cited as M. PAUUSH].
25. INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 254.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 14, at 4-5; James, supra note 19, at
628-29; Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 29, 30 (1959); Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforcing the Accountability of Cor-
porate Management and Related Activities of the S.E.C., 32 VA. L. REv. 497, 499-500
(1946).
27. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, Tha MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (rev. ed. 1968); L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How Tim BANKERS
UsE IT (1914); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MIcH.
L. REV. 1025, 1048-49 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Tracy & MacChesney].
28. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPoRATIoN AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 119-252 (rev. ed. 1968) (rights of shareholders); Shulman, Civil Liability and
the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933) (rights of purchasers of securities).
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state regulation of securities transactions provided little protection.29
Moreover, the more important members of the securities industry had
gained exemption from state regulation early in the 1920's by per-
suading state legislatures of the virtues of self-regulation.3 ° By the
early thirties, however, it was clear that self-regulation in the securi-
ties field was ineffectual."'
Reform of the securities markets became a significant political
issue in the 1932 presidential campaign primarily because of the spec-
ific abuses associated with the stock market boom and crash of
the twenties, but also because of uncontrolled financial and corporate
power and the failure of both state regulation and industry self-regula-
tion. Franklin Roosevelt had long been an advocate of corporate and
securities reform, and the 1932 Democratic party platform contained a
specific plank calling for compulsory disclosure in connection with
securities issues and for regulation of the securities exchanges.32
The demand for reform was concerned with the need for creating
some means of public control over the conduct of financial and corpor-
ate leaders, both to prevent the recurrence of recent abuses in the sec-
urities markets, and more generally to insure that such persons ob-
served the proper fiduciary standards in managing the invested funds
of individual investors. It might be supposed that these goals could
have been met most effectively by establishing a federal system of sub-
stantive regulations, perhaps an expanded version of the direct regu-
lation practiced by state securities commissions which simply prohib-
ited fraudulent or highly speculative offerings. The legislation actu-
ally passed, however, was less substantive; the Securities Act of 1933
imposed only disclosure and antifraud requirements, and the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, although directly prohibiting some manip-
ulative activities, primarily relied on disclosure and industry self-regu-
lation to control the conduct of those in the investment community
The choice of disclosure as the primary means of policing the
securities industry reflected the influence which the views of Louis D.
Brandeis had had on President Roosevelt and on individuals involved
in drafting the securities legislation. 3  As mentioned earlier, Brandeis
29. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 105-06; M. PARRISH, supra note 24, at 28-
29 (1970).
30. M. PARRISH, supra note 24, at 23-24, 31.
31. Id. at 38-40.
32. See R. DE BEDTS, supra note 23, at 30-33; INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note
19, at 353. The language of the Democratic party platform is quoted in R. DE BEDTS,
supra note 23, at 25.
33. See R. DE BEDTS, supra note 23, at 34, 199; W LEUCHTENBuRG, FRANKLIN
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had been a leading critic of those controlling the major financial insti-
tutions because of their failure to abide by fiduciary standards re-
quired of those who manage other people's money. Brandeis had ar-
gued persuasively that publicity was the most effective means of en-
forcing such standards and of markedly curtailing self-dealing and con-
flicts of interest.14  Disclosure was a desirable regulatory device be-
cause it not only inhibited illegal activity but also tended to discour-
age conduct which, although technically legal, was not entirely consis-
tent with the highest fiduciary standards of behavior. 5 Moreover, dis-
closure could achieve such effects with a minimum of government in-
tervention, reflecting the dislike of Brandeis and his followers for ex-
tensive governmental reform programs.3 6
The disclosure concept suited both the general philosophy and the
immediate political needs of the Roosevelt administration. Roosevelt
and his advisers, believing that the nation's economic recovery de-
pended on a revival of confidence in, and within, the private sector,
37
saw the immediate goal of financial reform as the restoration of the
public's confidence in the securities markets.3 8 Presumably this could
be done only if the public believed that the abuses which charac-
terized the securities markets of the twenties would not recur. On
the other hand, if business were to revive, the admimstration did not
want to destroy the confidence of the business community by excessive
governmental intervention in the "delicate mechanism" of the stock
market."9
A disclosure approach to securities regulation responded to both
of these needs. Disclosure would enable public investors to protect
D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL [hereinafter cited as W LEUCHTENBURG] 59 (1963);
1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 123, 127 & n.17; R. MoLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL 306
(1966).
34. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How Tm BANKERS USE IT 99-
105 (1914).
35. See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 408, 408-
09 (1962); Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, 8 FORTuNE, August 1933,
at 53, 55 [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter]; Longstreth, Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity Panel: The Role of the SEC, 28 Bus. LAw. 215, 226-27 (special issue 1973). See
generally Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1273 (1963).
36. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 309-11 (1932) (dissent);
W. LEucHTEmBuRG, supra note 33, at 59-60; M. PARRISH, supra note 24, at 61-62.
37. See M. PARiHusr, supra note 24, at 2-4; A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL 3, 5 (1958); cf. 2 SEC ANN. REP. 1
(1936).
38. See MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT TO CONGRESS ON MARCH
29, 1933, in H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 2; 25 SEC ANN. REP. xiii (1959).
39. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEw
DEAL 5 (1958).
themselves against the more blatant forms of exploitation. According
to the Brandeis theory, disclosure would also protect investors by in-
directly deterring fraud and unethical behavior. At the same time,
the financial commuity generally considered a disclosure statute ac-
ceptable. 0  Investment bankers had an affirmative interest in ob-
taming information about their corporate clients,4 while the major
corporations were already used to revealing some information as a
prerequisite to having their securities listed on the stock exchanges.4 -
Moreover, it was difficult to oppose disclosure without appearing to
advocate fraud.43 Finally, mild regulation in the form of disclosure
had some appeal to the financial commuity as a whole because it
would tend to eliminate the marginal members of the investment com-
munity who created "unfair" competition for established firms.44 Thus
a law requiring disclosure and little more would aid in protecting the
public and restoring its confidence and yet would not adversely affect
the morale of the business community
The Disclosure Statutes
It was apparent from the outset that the 1933 and 1934 Acts
were not ideally suited to protect the small investor against the kinds
of abuses about which Congress expressed concern. 45  Contemporary
commentators argued that although the required disclosures would ob-
viously deter some fraud on unsophisticated investors, their primary
use would be to enable investment professionals to evaluate securi-
ties more accurately 46 The small investor, then, would receive only
40. H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 3, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note
19, at 357; M. PARRISH, supra note 24, at 47
41. See INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 363; Bates, Some Effects of the
Securities Act upon Investment Banking Practices, 4 L. & CONTEMP PROB. 72, 77
(1937).
42. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 259 (rev. ed. 1968) M. PARRISH, supra note 24, at 38-41, Benston, Required Dis-
closure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
63 AM. ECON. REV 132, 133 (1973).
43. See H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 3.
44. See S. REP No. 47, supra note 11, at 1; R. DE BEDTS, supra note 23, at
49.
45. See INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 362; Douglas & Bates, The Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171-72 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas & Bates]; Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 109
46. The Congressional reports relating to the 1933 Act contained no explicit dis-
cussion of promoting accurate investment analysis, see H.R. REP No. 85, supra note
14; S. REP No, 47, supra note 11, but the legislative history of the 1934 Act does
seem to refer to efficient markets as well as honest markets as one goal of disclosure
laws. See H.R. REP No. 1383, supra note 14. Moreover, although the disclosure
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the indirect benefit of having market price of securities more reliably
reflect their true intrinsic value.47 From the beginning, therefore, the
statutory disclosure process contained an inherent conflict: on the one
hand, Congress expected disclosure to be effective in protecting un-
wary investors while on the other hand it had created a statutory scheme
more suited as a whole to making useful investment information gen-
erally available than to protecting unsophisticated investors from fraud
and unscrupulous behavior.
Although some of the weaknesses of the protective function were
inherent in the choice of disclosure instead of direct substantive regu-
lation, there were particular provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
expected by Congress to serve a protective function, which in several
instances were not well designed for that purpose. This section re-
views the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which illustrate this
dual role, examines the weakness of the protective provisions, and sug-
gests that many of the commission's rules now seen as illogical were
in fact a rational attempt to increase the protection of the unwary in-
vestor in spite of the limitations of the statutory scheme.
The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 established disclosure requirements
for the issuance of new securities.48 Under the statute, no new security
could be offered or sold in interstate commerce, unless a specific exemp-
tion was available, until a registration statement covering the security
had been filed with the commission and had become effective.49
statutes themselves did not make clear whether they were intended to promote efficient
markets as well as protect investors, the information required to be disclosed by the
statutes went beyond that needed simply to detect fraud. Heller, "Integration" of the
Dissemination of Information Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 29 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 749, 768-69, 771 (1964).
47. Douglas & Bates, supra note 45, at 172.
48. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 4, 5, ch. 38, §§ 4, 5, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e (1970). For discussions of the statute as originally
enacted, see Douglas & Bates, supra note 45; James, supra note 19.
49. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3-5, ch. 38, §§ 3-5, 48 Stat. 75-77 (1933), as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77e (1970); H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 6-7. Some
exemptions from the registration and prospectus delivery requirements were based on
the nature of the security being sold and other exemptions applied to all securities sold
in particular types of transactions. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3, 4, ch. 38, §§ 3, 4,
48 Stat. 75-77 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77c, 77d (1970). Registration was
required if outstanding securities were sold by the issuer, an underwriter with respect
to the issuer, or a "control person" of the issuer. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 4(1),
5, ch. 38, §§ 4(1), 5, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(i), 77e (1970).
The legislative history noted that the exemptions served to limit the bill to transactions
The commission in principle had no authority to pass on the quality
of the registered securities.5" Thus, although a waiting period of twen-
ty days between the filing date and the effective date was provided
to give the commission time to determine whether the registration state-
ment complied with the appropriate disclosure requirements, the state-
ment became effective automatically at the end of the twenty day period
if disclosure was adequate, regardless of the apparent quality of the
security "' The commission could issue a stop order and prevent the
statement from becoming effective only if disclosure was inadequate or
misleading. 52
Once the registration statement became effective, the securities
could be sold, but a prospectus containing the information in the
registration statement had to be delivered to all the purchasers.53 The
statute listed the specific information required to be included in both
the registration statement and the prospectus, but gave the commission
broad discretion to vary such requirements.54 In addition to establish-
ing a disclosure procedure for new issues, the Securities Act directly pro-
hibited certain actions in connection with the sales of securities and es-
tablished private remedies for those who had purchased securities which
were sold without proper disclosure or by the use of misleading state-
ments.55
where there was "need of public protection to prevent recurrences of demonstrated
abuses." H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 7
50. The act made it a criminal offense to represent that the commission had
found a registration statement to be true on its face or that the commission had passed
on the merits of the security. Securities Act of 1933, § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1970).
51. Securities Act of 1933, § 8, ch. 38, § 8, 48 Stat. 79 (1933), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
52. Id.
53. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5(b)(2), 10, ch. 38, §§ 5(b)(2), 10, 48 Stat. 77,
81 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b) (2), 77j; (1970). The prospectus delivery
requirement did not apply to sales by persons other than issuers, underwriters, or deal-
ers, to unsolicited sales by brokers, or sales by dealers after the period of the initial
offering. Securities Act of 1933, § 4, ch. 38, § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970). Because the act applied only to transactions in interstate
commerce, the prospectus delivery requirements did not apply if securities were sold
and delivered without use of the mails of interstate commerce. Until the early 1940s,
the prospectus consisted of the repetition in narrative form of the information already
set forth in the registration statement, although condensation was allowed. Since the
early 1940s, the prospectus has constituted part of the registration statement itself, the
remainder of the registration statement consisting of information not required to be
distributed to investors, such as exhibits. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 70-71.
54. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, ch. 38, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A,
48 Stat. 78, 81, 88 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (1970).
55. Section 17 prohibited any sale of securities by means of misrepresentation
or other fraudulent devices and also prohibited the publication of any article or "tip-
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As previously suggested, the set of rules just reviewed was in-
tended to serve two broad purposes. The statute was intended on the
one hand to promote efficient allocation of capital resources through
well-informed securities markets, and, on the other hand, to prevent
those forms of fraud dependent on secrecy of misinformation and to dis-
courage activities by securities sellers, underwriters, and corporate in-
siders which are inconsistent with "high standards of trusteeship."5
The manner in which the 1933 Act advanced the first goal, an
increase in useful investment information, was self-evident. Schedule
A of the statute required that the registration statement filed with the
commission and the prospectus given to the purchaser must describe
the business of the issuer, the nature of the securities being sold, and
the identity and relevant financial interests of those distributing the
securities and managing the issuer.57  The draftsmen expected that,
during the waiting period, the information in the registration state-
ments would be disseminated to the public by investment services and
advisers.58 Thus, although it was frequently pointed out that the
average investor was incapable of making an informed investment
judgment on the basis of the complicated disclosures in the prospec-
tus, it was expected that the statutory purpose of facilitating accurate
investment analysis would be fully achieved if professional advisers
utilized the registration statements and prospectuses to evaluate the
securities for investors.59
The effect of the 1933 Act was less direct in achieving the second
goal of protecting investors from fraud and improving business stand-
ards. Nevertheless, given the present assumption that the purpose of
disclosure is largely to provide information, it bears emphasizing that
the 1933 Act was clearly intended to protect as well as to inform. The
ster's sheet" about securities unless the author disclosed any financial interest he had
in the sale of the securities. Section 12 provided a civil remedy for buyers of secun-
ties, whether newly issued or not, which were sold m violation of the registration and
prospectus requirements or by means of oral or written misrepresentations, and section
11 provided a civil remedy for buyers of newly issued securities sold pursuant to a
misleading registration statement. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 17, ch. 38, §§
11, 12, 17, 48 Stat. 82-85 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77g (1970).
56. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 3. Neither the statute nor the legisla-
tive history explicitly identified or distinguished between the two purposes served by
full disclosure, but contemporary commentators recognized and commented on both as-
pects. See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, supra note 45, at 172.
57. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, ch. 38, §§ 7, 10, Schedule A,
48 Stat. 78, 81, 88 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (1970).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 5-6, 20.
59. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 52-53; Douglas & Bates, supra note 45,
at 172; Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
Liw. 300, 301-03 n.6 (1961).
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legislative history indicates that four particular requirements-the fil-
ing of the registration statement, the waiting period, the prospectus
delivery requirement, and the provision imposing civil liability on the
issuer and its officers, directors and underwriters-were all intended
to have a significant impact.
The registration statement was generally believed to be an effec-
tive deterrent to the most blatantly fraudulent schemes, presumably
because the promoters either would realize that their plan could not
succeed without secrecy or would be reluctant to disclose the nature
of their activities to public officials.6 ° In addition, it was intended to
discourage both illegal and unethical actions by corporate management
and promoters. 61 In order to achieve this latter effect, the statute re-
quired extensive disclosures about all forms of underwriters' compen-
sation and about any dealings between the corporation and its offi-
cers, directors or major shareholders. 62  Such disclosures, required
chiefly to discourage improper conduct in those areas, 63 had little rele-
vance for investment analysis purposes. 4
The waiting period was intended to discourage high-pressure
salesmanship by preventing sales of the securities until information in
the registration statement could be disseminated. 65 Thus, retail secur-
ities distributors would not be forced to make commitments blindly
and then to unload the securities on the public by any means in order
to get rid of them.66
The prospectus contained basically the same information as the
registration statement, but was expected to serve additional protective
functions. In particular, the prospectus delivery requirement was in-
tended to limit the selling arguments used by securities salesmen.Y
First, the prospectus delivery requirement directly limited inaccurate or
60. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 7; Douglas & Bates, supra note 45,
at 172. It was expected that state securities commissions would examine the regis-
tration statement filed with the commission presumably in order to detect violations
of state securities laws. See H.R. REP No. 85, supra at 5-6.
61. Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 106; James, supra note 19, at 646.
62. Of the twenty-seven required items of information m Schedule A, eight in-
volved such matters. Items 7, 10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, Securities Act of 1933,
Schedule A, 48 Stat. 88 (1933); see Douglas & Bates, supra note 45, at 188 (com-
menting on stress on such items).
63. See Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 55.
64. See Myths, supra note 3, at 1171 & n.90; Soft Information, supra note 3,
at 264 n.36.
65. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 3-4, 7-8.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id.
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overly optimistic selling arguments which involved written material.
No written material advertising or offering for sale any new security
could be used unless it was a prospectus which complied with the sta-
tutory requirements or was accompanied by such a prospectus.68  Sec-
ond, it was expected that oral arguments would be affected by the
knowledge that the potential buyer had access to the thorough and
reliable information in the prospectus. Finally, by making the buyer
aware that securities were "intricate merchandise," the prospectus ap-
parently was intended to make investors more wary of buying securities
on the basis of a few glib promises.69
Although the prospectus was seemingly intended to have a quite
significant protective impact, its effect in practice was undermined by
the statutory provision that the prospectus need not be delivered to
the buyer until the purchased securities were delivered to him."° As a
practical matter, then, an investor could be pursuaded to buy securit-
ies on the basis of misleading oral statements and would not receive
his prospectus until delivery of those securities.71 Although at the
time of delivery the buyer could of course refuse to complete the pur-
chase once he had seen the prospectus, the prospectus disclosures would
obviously have been much more effective had they reached the in-
vestor before the initial decision, and the resultant psychological com-
mitment to buy, had been made.72 Moreover, as noted earlier, the
prospectus was so elaborate that many investors were unable to detect
even blatant fraud solely by reading It.7' Thus, although the prospec-
tus provisions may have curtailed misleading promotional literature,
they were not well suited to deter sales based on misleading oral state-
ments.
The fourth protective element of the 1933 Act was section 11.
68. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b)(1), ch. 38, § 5(b)(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1970).
69. See H.R. RP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 8.
70. Although § 5(b) (1) required that any written offer be m the form of a statu-
tory prospectus, oral offers were not subject to the statute. If a security were sold
by means of an oral offer, the only relevant prospectus requirement was § 5(b) (2),
which required that any securities delivered through the mails or m interstate commerce
must be accompanied by a statutory prospectus. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, ch. 38,
§ 5, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
71. Id. In fact, most investors purchased securities under just such conditions.
Byse & Bradley, Proposals to Amend the Registration and Prospectus Requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 609, 617 (1948).
72. Byse & Bradley, Proposals to Amend the Registration and Prospectus Re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 96 U. PA. L. Rnv. 609, 636 (1948); Truth
in Securities, supra note 3, at 1350-51.
73. See INvES mNT BANKING, supra note 19, at 362.
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Its civil liability provisions were intended to bring "into the general
field of security selling, ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing
common to every fiduciary undertaking."74  To this end, section 11
imposed what was regarded at the time as staggering civil lia-
bility on the issuer, its officers and directors, the underwriters and any
other experts involved, for misleading or inadequate disclosure in the
registration statement.7 5 Any such person could protect himself from
liability by showing that after a reasonable investigation he had a rea-
sonable belief in the statement's accuracy, with reasonableness being
determined by the standards applicable to one in a fiduciary posi-
tion. 76
Although the only obligation imposed directly by the provisions
was that of making full disclosure, it is clear that Congress expected
the provision to produce not only full disclosure but "honesty, care,
and competence" on the part of those subject to the liability 7 The
"reasonable Investigation" obligation of section 11 was expected to en-
courage the honest but negligent director to become more deeply in-
volved in corporate affairs, with presumably beneficial effects on the
corporation and the investors.7 8  Moreover, to the extent that cor-
porate abuses resulted from self-dealing or fraud, the obligation to dis-
close such activities or face personal liability under section 11 would
74. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 5.
75. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); see Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Bank-
ing and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 805 (1972).
76. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(c), ch. 38, § 11(c), 48 Stat. 83 (1933). The
statute was amended in 1934 to provide that the standard of reasonableness should be
that of "a prudent man in the management of his own property," 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)
(1970), but the change was not regarded as very significant. See 3 L. Loss, supra
note 16, at 1726; Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and
the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 806 n.141 (1972).
77. In discussing the civil liability provisions, the House report stated: 'Their
essential characteristic consists of a requirement that all those responsible for state-
ments upon the face of which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held
to standards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary. Honesty, care, and compe-
tence are the demands of trusteeship. If it be said that the imposition of such
responsibilities upon these persons will be to alter corporate organization and corporate
practice in this country, such a result is only what your committee expects. Di-
rectors should assume the responsibility of directing and if their manifold activities
make real directing impossible, they should be held responsible to the unsuspecting pub-
lic for their neglect. Instead of impeding honest business, the imposition of li-
abilities of this character cames over into the general field of security selling, ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing common to every fiduciary undertaking." H.R.
REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 5; see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, at 6-7
(July 26, 1972).
78. See Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 111.
[Vol 25
January 19741 DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES REGULATION
presumably encourage underwriters or corporate insiders to avoid such
activities. 9 If the activities were illegal under state law, disclosure
could result in state enforcement action or private suits. If the activi-
ties were not technically illegal, but smiply dubious or unethical, many
would forego such activity rather than publicly disclose it.
Section 11 represents the most direct attempt to protect unwary
investors by imposing "high standards of trusteeship" on those respon-
sible for the investment of "other people's money." Nevertheless, sec-
tion 1.1 imposed liability only for failure to file an accurate registration
statement, meaning that a reasonable investigation followed by accurate
disclosure of fraud, self-dealing or other behavior would be entirely
consistent with the statutory terms. Again, it was hoped that the ob-
ligation to disclose would indirectly result in responsible underwriting
behavior and ethical corporate management.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
also reflected congressional intent to use disclosure for protective as
well as informational purposes. Basically, the 1934 Act sought to ex-
tend to existing securities many of the rules the 1933 Act introduced
for new securities. Thus, the statute required issuers of securities listed
on stock exchanges to register such securities with the commission and
to file periodic reports designed to keep current the information in
the initial registration statement."' In addition, corporate insiders were
required to report any securities holdings in their corporation and any
changes m such holdings.8 Finally, the statute authorized the com-
mission to promulgate regulations governing the solicitation of proxies
from shareholders. In accordance with suggestions in the legislative
79. See id. at 55.
80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 13, ch. 404, H§ 12, 13, 48 Stat. 892-
95 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. H8 781, 78m (1970). In 1936, the act was amended
by the addition of § 15(d), which required issuers of unlisted securities who had filed
a registration statement under the 1933 Act with respect to an offenng of a certain
aggregate amount to comply with the periodic reporting requirements of section 13 so
long as they had outstanding securities worth a certain amount. Act of May 27, 1936,
ch. 462, § 3, 49 Stat. 1377, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 780(d) (1970).
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). In addition to the reporting requirement, section
16 authorized private suits for the recovery by a corporation of profits resulting from
any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of corporate stock by a corporate insider
within a six-month period.
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history, the commission almost immediately imposed disclosure re-
quirements as the means of regulating such solicitation.82
The registration and periodic reporting requirements were intended
both to provide useful investment information and to protect against
stock market manipulations wich were believed to depend on secrecy
for their success.83 It was presumed that if reliable information about
an issuer were available, investors could determine more readily when
stock prices reflected manipulative activity rather than the intrinsic value
of the security, and thus could protect themselves from fraud. This
protective function was somewhat lessened because periodic reports
were filed only with the commission and were not made directly avail-
able to investors.84 Investors did not, therefore, have access to the
detailed and conservatively stated disclosures required by the commis-
sion--disclosures designed to reveal price mampulation or unfair as-
pects of the securities. 85  The lack of a delivery requirement did not
undercut the informational purpose of the reports as much, however,
since investment services and advisers had a financial interest in con-
veying the basic data about securities to investors. Moreover, from an
investment analysis point of view, investors would benefit by trading in
a market which reflected the general availability of reliable information
whether or not they learned of such information individually 11
82. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 378
(1935), as amended SEC Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240 14a-1 - 14a-103 (1973); see
2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 868-70.
83. See H.R. REP No. 1383, supra note 14, at 5, 11, Loomis, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 214, 226 (1959). In addition to establishing disclosure requirements, the 1934
Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission, prohibited a variety of mamp-
ulative activities in connection with stock exchange trading, provided for the regulation
of margin purchases of securities, and established or authorized the establishment of
regulatory machinery, primarily based on the concept of self-regulation, to control the
stock exchange, their members, and the over-the-counter markets. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1
(1970). See generally Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 27, at 1025.
84. Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 27, at 1057-58.
85. The commission required disclosure documents to be not only detailed and
accurate but also to present information conservatively or even pessimistically. Much
of the protective impact of such disclosures resulted from exposing investors directly
to a pessimistic rather than optimistic picture of the issuer's prospects. This impact
depended on delivery of the required disclosure document to the investor, since pessi-
mistic aspects were apt to be filtered out when the information was conveyed to the
investor by those interested in selling him the security. See text accompanying notes
126-136 infra.
86. Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 27, at 1058.
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The insider reporting requirements and the proxy solicitation pro-
visions both employed disclosure for protective purposes. The insider
reporting requirements reflected a primarily regulatory use of disclo-
sure, since the disclosure was intended to deter improper use of cor-
poration information by insiders.8 7  Though the statute provided a
specific sanction for certain insider trading, the disclosure requirement
was expected to deter insider trading not reached by that sanction. 8
The proxy provisions simply authorized the commission to regulate
proxy solicitation in any appropriate manner.8 9 The provisions were
explicitly protective in purpose; the legislative history shows that the
problem caused by the separation of ownership and control in large
corporations was noted9 and that the proxy provisions were described
as designed to prevent corporate insiders from using proxies to take
"selfish advantage" of shareholders.91 The commission's choice of dis-
closure to implement its authority underlines the contemporary view of
disclosure as effective to protect investors from exploitations.92
The Dual Function of the Disclosure Process
The foregoing survey of the background and legislative history
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
suggests the nature of the two basic purposes-informational and pro-
tective-which disclosure requirements were expected to serve as part
of a scheme of federal securities regulation. Both the 1933 and 1934
Acts were well-designed to provide disclosure for informational pur-
poses. Detailed information useful for investment analysis was made
available through the commission; and presumably its utilization by
sophisticated investors and investment professionals would lead to effi-
cient securities markets. Such disclosure would indirectly benefit the
small investor in his investment decisions by affording him better in-
87. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 14, at 24-25; S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 68 (1934); Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 27, at 1056-57.
88. "It is hoped, however, that the publicity features of the bill will tend to bring
these practices [improper use of inside information] into disrepute and encourage the
voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of large cor-
porate enterprises whose securities are registered on the public exchanges." H.R. REP.
No. 1383, supra note 14, at 13.
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
90. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 5.
91. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 14, at 14; see Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforc-
ing the Accountability of Corporate Management and Related Activities of the S.E.C.,
32 VA. L. REv. 497, 499-500 (1946).
92. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 868-69.
vestment advice and by making market prices more accurate indica-
tors of security values. It was recognized, however, that the average
investor could make little direct use of the detailed disclosures re-
quired and that the informational benefits of disclosure depended upon
effective use of the information by those able to understand it. 3 There-
fore, the informational effect of disclosure was not dependent upon
physical delivery of the disclosures to individual investors. For this
reason, the defects in the prospectus delivery rules and the absence of
any disclosure delivery requirements in the 1934 Act did not prevent
the statutory disclosure scheme from effectively achieving its informa-
tional purpose.
The statutory scheme was somewhat less effective in achieving the
protective purposes intended by Congress. 4 A glance at several as-
pects of the statutes' investor protection goal shows that the statutes
operated only indirectly to achieve this purpose. First, it was hoped
that the mere existence of the disclosure requirements would improve
general ethical standards in the corporate and financial communities.
The effect thus depended on the voluntary abandonment of unethical
practices by those subject to disclosure requirements, which, as has
been seen, included conflict of interest disclosure requirements, in-
sider trading sanctions, and section 11 civil liability Second, it was
believed that disclosure would deter those fraudulent practices depen-
dent for their success on secrecy or misinformation both in the new is-
sue market and in the trading markets. Finally, the 1933 Act's
waiting period and prospectus delivery requirements were designed
to present the investor accurate and detailed information about secur-
ities and in this way to curtail misleading promotional literature and to
counteract misleading or glib sales arguments.
Disclosure is a rather indirect way of achieving the protective
purposes listed above. A comparison between the specific disclosure
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the discussion of them in
the legislative history suggests that from the outset there was some in-
consistency between the statutory scheme itself, which functioned most
effectively to provide informational disclosure, and the articulated ex-
pectations about the impact of disclosure, which emphasized its protec-
93. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, at 4 (July 26, 1972); WHEAT RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 52-53; Douglas & Bates, supra note 45, at 172; Truth in Securi-
ties, supra note 3, at 1353.
94. See INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 19, at 362-63, Morton & Booker, The
Paradoxical Nature of Federal Securities Regulation, 44 DENVER L.I 479, 490-97
(1967).
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five purposes. The choice of a disclosure scheme rather than direct
regulation was in part motivated by political considerations, and was
not an entirely effective remedy for the abuses-which Congress wished
to eliminate.
As a result, in its early years, the commission continued to be
faced with distasteful practices, although such practices were now dis-
closed. In response, the commission used its discretionary powers to
develop a disclosure process which provided more protection to inves-
tors than the bare statutory scheme seemed to permit. While some of
the resulting distortions in the process can now be criticized, the
legislative history of the disclosure laws indicates that the commission
had a mandate to use its statutory authority to the greatest extent possi-
ble to protect unwary investors from fraud and exploitation.
Administrative Development of the Disclosure Process
When the commission first began its work in 1934, it was charged
with administering a disclosure scheme best suited to eliciting informa-
tion useful for investment analysis purposes by sophisticated investors
even though Congress had clearly intended that this scheme be used
to improve business standards and protect unwary investors against
fraud or exploitation. This section reviews the commission's efforts
to increase the protection afforded investors by, for example, empha-
sizing the 1933 Act winch required direct disclosure rather than the
1934 Act which did not, and by imposing substantive requirements
on issues subject to the registration by use of its enormous discretionary
power over the manner in which information was disclosed.
In some instances, the commission's concern with protecting
investors resulted in disclosure policies which undercut the disclosure's
informational effect by emphasizing information of little interest to
investment analysts, by requiring disclosures so pessimistic as to be
95. The commission has relied on disclosure because, although it has substantial
direct regulatory powers over the securities industry under the 1934 Act, until recently
it has been reluctant to exercise such powers.
'This hesitancy was due m part to the political power of the industry organiza-
tions, which in turn rested heavily on the traditionally American belief that business-
men know more about how business should be run than government officials do, and
m part to the Commission's actual incapacity to conduct the sort of extensive inquiry
that would enable it to establish the case for changes in the way the game is played."
Ratner, The SEC: Portrait of the Agency as a Thirty-Seven Year Old, 45 ST. JoHN's
L. REV. 583, 591 (1971); see SuBcommrrnE ON SEcurIs, SENATE CoMMrrTTE ON
BANKiNG, HousiNG & URBAN ArFAis, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., SECURITs INDUSTRY STUDY
180 (Comm. Print 1973).
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misleading, and by imposing burdensome restrictions which had no
function in terms of the disclosure's informational purpose. To some
extent these protective aspects of disclosure are responsible for the cnt-
icism currently leveled at the disclosure process as illogical or nonfunc-
tional.
The Framework of Protective Disclosure
The commission has traditionally emphasized disclosure require-
ments imposed by the 1933 Act, treating 1934 Act disclosures as
somewhat less important. 96 The emphasis reflects the fact that, be-
cause of the special compensation paid to those selling newly issued
securities, initial distributions of securities are regarded as much more
likely than trading transactions to involve the fraud or improper sell-
ing activities which necessitate protective disclosure.9 7  Moreover,
disclosures under the 1933 Act have a greater protective impact than
reports under the 1934 Act because they are actually delivered to in-
vestors. As a result, disclosures in 1933 Act prospectuses can serve
to counteract misleading sales promises, to warn the investor of risk
factors, and generally to emphasize the negative rather than the positive
aspects of the security Emphasis on 1933 Act disclosures thus meant
emphasis on those disclosures most needed and best suited to protect-
ing ivestors.98
The commission's protective concern is further illustrated by its ad-
mimstration of the proxy disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.
Before 1964, only issuers with securities listed on a stock exchange
were subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. It was
therefore argued that the commission had focused on 1933 Act dis-
closure because it thought that imposition of strict disclosure standards
under the 1934 Act would cause issuers to delist rather than comply "
96. Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at 1361, see WHEAT REPORT, supra note
7, at 11.
97. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 60; Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at
1385.
98. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 11; Heller, "Integration" of the Dis-
semination of Information Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 29 L. & CONTEMP PROB. 749, 763-64 (1964).
99. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 62. The argument is not entirely per-
suasive because, at least with respect to the registration and periodic reporting require-
ments, section 15(d) of the 1934 Act subjected most companies filing a registration
statement under the 1933 Act to 1934 Act disclosure requirements, whether or not they
had securities listed on an exchange. See note 80 supra. Moreover, as discussed in
the text, the commission did enforce the proxy disclosure rules quite vigorously, al-
though the proxy rules applied only to issuers with listed securities and not to section
15(d) companies.
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Despite this delisting problem, the commission has traditionally en-
forced the proxy disclosure requirements of the 1934- Act as stringently
as the prospectus disclosure rules of the 1933 Act. °10 The proxy rules,
intended primarily to protect investors, require that proxy state-
ments, like prospectuses, be physically delivered to the investors. The
commission's emphasis on prospectus and proxy disclosure and its down-
grading of 1934 Act periodic reports reflect its preference for pro-
tective disclosure over informational disclosure.
The same point is illustrated by the commission's enforcement of
the 1933 Act disclosure requirements, in connection with which it de-
veloped a discretionary review process which enabled it to prevent or
hamper sale of undesirable securities. The commission had authority
to refuse to allow a registration statement to become effective or to
suspend its effectiveness if the statement was "incomplete or inaccu-
rate in any material respect."'' By interpreting "incomplete or maccu-
rate" broadly, the commission could always find some defect in the
registration statement if it wished.'0 2 Therefore, whether a registra-
tion statement became effective was almost entirely dependent on the
commission's discretion and was not as automatic as the statute itself
seemed to suggest.10 3
The commission utilized this discretion in a selective way, making
the disclosure process easy for reliable issuers, while making it difficult
for issuers of fraudulent or highly speculative securities. 0 4 If the dis-
100. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 880; Codification Conference, supra note 3,
at 837; Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at 1361-62.
101. Securities Act of 1933, § 8(b), (d), ch. 38, § 8(b), (d), 48 Stat. 79 (1933),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d) (1970).
102. Securities Act of 1933, § 8(b), (d), ch. 38, § 8(b), (d), 48 Stat. 79 (1933),
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d) (1970); see Chilgren, Federal Securities Law, 3
JoHm MARSHALL L.Q. 85, 86 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Chilgren]; MacChesney, The
Securities Act and the Promoter, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 66, 69-70 (1936) [hereinafter cited
as The Securities Act and the Promoter]; Comment, Administrative Interpretation of
the Securities Act of 1933, 45 YALE L.J. 1076, 1097 (1936). For examples of dis-
closure held to be misleading m the commission's early years, see Krupsaw, Opinions
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 Miss. L.J. 8, 24-28 (1937).
103. See H.R. RE-P. No. 85, supra note 14, at 4; E. McCoRMICK, supra note 14,
at 240-41; cf. Woodside, Development of S.E.C. Practices in Processing Registration
Statements and Proxy Statements, 24 Bus. LAW. 375, 378 (1969). The commission's
exercise of discretion in this area is in practice not subject to judicial review. Codifica-
tion Conference, supra note 3, at 902 (remarks of Judge Henry J. Friendly).
104. See Chilgren, supra note 102, at 91, MacChesney, Further Developments in
"Disclosure" under the Securities Act, 33 ILL. L. Rnv. 145, 168 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as Further Developments] (commission more insistent on particular disclosure where
dubious about merits of security); MacChesney, supra note 102, at 69 (list of fraudulent
promoters maintained by the commission and registration statements in which their
names appeared more thoroughly investigated).
closure process did not discourage the latter group altogether from
floating their issues, they were forced to make such negative disclo-
sures that it was very difficult for them to sell their secritles.'0 5
Moreover, some promoters actually changed financing plans rather than
attempt to sell securities after the commission forced them to disclose
the excessive profits going to promoters or the lack of protection for
the interests of public investors. 106
The commission also utilized stop order proceedings in a selective
manner, proceeding primarily against those whom it regarded as fraudu-
lent or unethical.1 0 7 Faced with registration statements which it viewed
as defective but which were good faith attempts to comply with the
requirements, the conimssion used an informal deficiency letter re-
view process to correct defects. By contrast, it was quick to commence
formal stop order proceedings in connection with registration state-
ments which it regarded as deliberate attempts to evade the disclosure
requirements. 0 8  Similarly, after amendments were made to correct a
registration statement, the commission would dismiss stop order pro-
ceedings against the good faith registration statements, but would
continue the proceedings and publish an opinion when it believed the
issuer had been guilty of a "disregard of fundamental business ethics." 10 9
Publicity was thus used as a substitute for the power to bar unqualified
securities from the market."10
105. See PLI DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES AND INSIDERS 8
(Flom, Garfinkel & Freund eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS];
Comment, Administrative Interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933, 45 YALE L.J.
1076, 1097 (1936).
106. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 185-86; E. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at
302-04. Comparable alterations in lnsider transactions have occurred as a result of dis-
closure requirements. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.
107 See Further Developments, supra note 104, at 165-66; Comment, Administra-
tive Interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933, 45 YALE L.J. 1076, 1097 (1936). Reg-
istration statements which failed to become effective in the early years because of
stop orders, refusal orders, or withdrawal orders tended on the merits to be poor risks
for investors. See Cale, A Study of Ineffective Investment Trust and Precious Metal
Minng Issues, 4 L. & CONTEMP PROB. 32, 43 (1937).
108. See 4 SEC ANN. REP 35 (1938); Johnson & Jackson, The Securities and Ex-
change Commission: Its Organization and Functions Under the Securities Act of 1933,
4 L. & CONTEMP PROB. 3, 11 (1937); Woodside, Development of S.E.C. Practices in
Processing Registration Statements and Proxy Statements, 24 Bus. LAW 375, 378
(1969).
109. In re Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 37, 47 (1934); Further Developments,
supra note 104, at 164-65.
110. See Krupsaw, Opinions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 Miss.
L.J. 8, 11 & n.15, 16 & n.39 (1937); MacChesney & O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the
Securities Act, 4 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 133, 152-53 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Mac-
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In a more subtle fashion, the commission interpreted disclosures
in such a way as to effectively create certain substantive requirements
for securities issues."' An issuer's statement of the value of its assets
was treated as a representation that a bona fide method of appraisal
had been used. 12 More generally, the commission interpreted what
were commonly considered to be matters of opinion as if they contained
certain assertions of fact, and if those facts were not true in the issuer's
case, the expression of opinion was regarded as misleading."1 3 For
example, persons could not be described as experts unless they had cer-
tain qualifications and had performed their jobs consistently with the
normal professional standards of experts in their particular field.': 4
Furthermore, even where a statement of opinion involved a matter over
which reasonable men could differ, the commission would insist that
its point of view was the only accurate one if it regarded the securities
as of dubious merit." 5
By applying the kinds of disclosure rules described above, the
commission was able to treat issuers of speculative securities in a way
that approached direct regulation on the basis of fairness. Few would
dispute that the disclosure process was made easy for reliable issuers
but difficult for fraudulent or dubious promoters. 1 6 The commission
was established to protect investors and utilized disclosure aggressively
to do so.' 17 In a few instances, however, the commission's protective
Chesney & O'Brien]. Publicity has its limits. See Morton & Booker, The Paradoxical
Nature of Federal Securities Regulation, 44 DENvBR L.J 479, 494, 497 n.54 (1967).
111. See, e.g., In re Unity Gold Corp., 1 S.E.C. 25, 33 (1934) (state law concern-
ing acquisition of property for stock which was then donated back to issuer irrelevant
when determining whether disclosure of value was "truthful" for Securities Act pur-
poses); In re Brandy-Wine Brewing Co., I S.E.C. 123, 135 (1935) (conclusiveness of
directors' valuation under state law not binding on the commission for disclosure pur-
poses); MacChesney, supra note 102, at 74-75.
112. In re Haddam Distillers Corp., I S.E.C. 37, 42 (1934); see Further Develop-
ments, supra note 104, at 147-49.
113. See In re American Kid Co., 1 S.E.C. 694 (1936) (various estimates and opin-
ions misleading when out of line with rest of industry and not substantiated by evi-
dence).
114. See MacChesney & O'Brien, supra note 110, at 144-45.
115. See Further Developments, supra note 104, at 168 ('The insistence of the
Commission on its view of the close fact question as to availability of credit would
suggest that the decision was based on the merits of the enterprise. ").
116. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 185-86; Chilgren, supra note 102, at 86.
But see ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SEcuRITrIs 376 (H.
Manne ed. 1969) (remarks of Professor Bossons) (admimstrative discrimination
against speculative issuers is "extra-legal").
117. "It is quite apparent that the nature and extent of the disclosure accomplished
by the administration of the Act exceeds that anticipated by early commentators on
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impulses resulted in a disclosure process less effective than it might
have been in providing sophisticated investors and professionals with
information useful in investment analysis. 1 8
The Drawbacks of Protective Disclosure
Concerned with protecting investors, the commission developed
practices which were either useless or counterproductive in terms of pro-
viding better information for investment analysis purposes. These in-
cluded the delegation of its authority to regulate accounting, its insis-
tence on "factual" disclosure, with a pessimistic tone, and the adop-
tion of illogical and vague rules defimng those transactions subject
to the registration requirement of the 1933 Act. Such practices, though
developed in response to particular abuses and effective in protecting
investors, imposed a cost in informational terms.
Accounting Policies
The disclosure statutes gave the commission ample authority to
establish the accounting methods to be followed for the required finan-
cial statements,"' thus giving the commission an opportunity to
require issuers to use a uniform method of accounting. Because in-
formed investment choices among competing securities can be made
more accurately if the disclosed financial data are comparably com-
puted, uniformity would have increased the usefulness of these disclo-
sures for informational purposes.' 20  The commission did not adopt a
required method of accounting, but, in effect, delegated the formula-
tion of accounting principles to the accounting profession and the cor-
porate community by requiring that financial statements be prepared
and presented in accordance with "generally accepted auditing stand-
ards.'
' 21
Since the accounting profession had generally adopted conserva-
tive accounting principles which minimized asset values, the account-
ants could be expected to aid in policing the most egregious overstate-
the statute." MacChesney & O'Brien, supra note 110, at 152; see Chilgren, supra note
102, at 86.
118. See Soft Information, supra note 3, at 264, 268 & n.46.
119. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b);
L. RAPPAPORT, S.E.C. ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 21.2 (3d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as L. RAPPAPORT].
120. Address by SEC Chairman Cohen, 19th Annual Conference of the Financial
Analysis Conference, May 24, 1966, in 122 J. ACCOUNTANCY 58-59 (Aug. 1966).
121. L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 119, at 26.8; see SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 4 (April 25, 1938).
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ments of the value of securities offered to unsophisticated investors.122
The accountants, however, had no strong interest in furthering com-
parability, because their clients' interests were best served by flexible
accounting principles allowing each enterprise to choose among "gen-
erally acceptable principles" in order to put its best foot forward.1 21
Without sustained pressure from the commission, therefore, it was
doubtful whether the accounting profession or the business commumty
would work to improve the comparability of financial reporting. Af-
ter its early years, however, the commission abandoned its activist
role in the accounting area and generally accepted whatever the ac-
counting profession approved or adopted.124  By delegating all of its
authority in the accounting area to the accountants, the commission
provided some protection against fraud but did little to improve the
usefulness of financial reporting for investment analysis purposes.2 5
"Factual" Disclosure
With respect to accounting, the commission's action was in es-
sence a sin of omission in that it failed to utilize an opportunity to im-
prove the usefulness of required financial disclosures for the purpose
of investment analysis. The commission's insistence on "factual"
disclosure and the exclusion of "soft" information from prospectuses,
however, was a sin of commission. 26 The commission took the posi-
tion that earnings projections, asset appraisals, evaluations of an enter-
prise's market position, and other information based on opimon or
estimates rather than historical fact were inherently manipulative, ob-
jectively nonverifiable, and detrimentally relied upon by the small
investor. Thus, such information could not be disclosed in prospec-
tuses and other commission filings, even though such information could
122. See 38 SEC ANN. REP. 34 (1972); LeBlanc, Accounting as a Consumer Pro-
tector, 27 Bus. Lw. 75, 79, 81 (1971).
123. Knpke, Conglomerates and the Moment of Truth in Accounting, 44 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 791, 792-94 (1970); see Myths, supra note 3, at 1184-86. For a gen-
eral discussion and case studies of manipulation of accounting methods, see A. BRILoFF,
UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTNG (1972).
124. Myths, supra note 3, at 1177.
125. Address by SEC Commissioner Whitney, Washington Society of Investment
Analysts, February 5, 1963, in L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 119, at 3.4.
126. The term "soft information" in the context of the commission's disclosure
policies was corned by Carl W. Schneider to refer to various kinds of information or
statements not susceptible of objective verification and therefore traditionally excluded
from disclosure documents filed with the commission. Mr. Schneider includes within
the term statements about the future, statements about past or present situations not
supported by specific data, subjective evaluations or opinions as to quality, and state-
ments of motive or intention. Soft Information, supra note 3, at 255.
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be highly useful for investment analysis purposes. 12  Because such
information was not subject to objective verification, it could be man-
ipulated to mislead investors into thinking a security was more de-
sirable than it was in fact. The commission's own experience had
taught it that such "soft" information frequently was disclosed in a mis-
leading fashion by fraudulent or unethical promoters. 128  In order
to protect the small investor who would tend to regard such informa-
tion as more definite and reliable than it was, the commission barred
all such disclosures from documents required to be filed with it.'2 '
In doing so, the commission deprived sophisticated investors of in-
formation which was considered highly useful for investment analysis
purposes.13°
Pessimistic Disclosure
The commission's practice of excluding "soft" information from
disclosure documents was one aspect of its broader policy of requiring
disclosure that was pessimistic in tone. While favorable information
which could not be objectively verified was excluded from filings, ad-
verse information had to be included even if it was highly uncertain. 3
Risk factors had to be thoroughly described and emphasized in the
overall presentation.' 32  Where required disclosures were not strictly
factual, as was the case for disclosures describing an issuer's dividend
policy or its competitive position, the commission required the inclu-
sion of disclaimer language which underlined the negative aspects of
the disclosures.' 33
Because most issuers were required to make these pessimistic dis-
closures, investors had difficulty distinguishing between moderately
successful enterprises and those on the verge of bankruptcy "I More-
127 Prospectuses, supra note 3, at 224-25; see Chalmers, Truth and Consequences
-The New Game in Forecasting, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 38 (1972); Soft Information,
supra note 3, at 268.
128. See Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Investor Relations Insitute,
Oct. 3, 1972, in Soft Information, supra note 3, at 268 n.46.
129. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. LAw 300, 307-08 (1961); Soft Information, supra note 3, at 258.
130. Soft Information, supra note 3, at 268.
131. Prospectuses, supra note 3, at 225; Soft Information, supra note 3, at 261-
62.
132. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 652 (1945); see WHEAT REPORT,
supra note 7, at 52; Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regula-
tion, 16 Bus. LAw. 300, 302 n.6, 319 n.34 (1961).
133. See New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus.
LAW. 505, 506, 525-26 (1973) (remarks of Mr. Sommer, Mr. Marsh).
134. Soft Information, supra note 3, at 267-68.
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over, the resulting disclosure could be affirmatively misleading to exist-
ing shareholders who might undervalue and therefore sell their secur-
ities because of the unrealistically pessimistic image presented in the
prospectus.'" 5 The disclaimer boilerplate and the negative bias thus
resulted in disclosure wich ranged from useless to actually misleading
for informational purposes.
The commission's accounting policy, its attitude toward "soft"
information and its insistence on a pessimistic bias and emphasis of
risk factors, indicated its concern with protecting the small investor
from buying a bad security rather than with enabling him to make an
affirmatively good investment decision.'" The commission's actions
suggest that its aim of promoting "informed investment decisions" re-
fers not to enabling investors to choose rationally among investments
on the basis of economic desirability, but to assuring that the investor
has been exposed to all the possible dangers involved in buying a
particular security before he makes his decision.13 7  Moreover, as the
prior discussion suggests, when the commission staff believes that a
security is "highly speculative," it may require such negative disclosure
that the buyer is not only warned of all the risks twice over but, in
effect, is discouraged from buying the security 13  As has been widely
remarked, this practice comes close to a determination with respect to
the quality of the security rather than to the adequacy of the disclo-
sure.139 Each of these approaches emphasizes protection at the ex-
pense of information.
Registration Requirements as Investor Protection
Another criticized aspect of the disclosure process is the illogical
135. Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Investor Relations Institute, Oct.
3, 1972, in Soft Information, supra note 3, at 268-69 n.46. The commission's emphasis
on conservative disclosure which tends to protect the buyer rather than the seller of
securities is consistent with its general emphasis on 1933 Act disclosure, which applies
only to sales of securities. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra; Manne, Account-
ing and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstel v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F.
304, 317 (1969).
136. Prospectuses, supra note 3, at 225; Soft Information, supra note 3, at 264.
137. "The act does not aim at the elimination of risk in investment, but only at
the disclosure of sufficient information to enable the investor to measure the risk." 13
SEC ANN. REP. 1 (1947); see WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 52. The commission's
recent concern with "hot issue" markets primarily involving new ventures reflects this
attitude; the commission believes that "disclosure relating to new ventures is par-
ticularly necessary, since investing in this type of venture may involve a greater
risk of loss." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5395 (June 1, 1973); see Soft Informa-
tion, supra note 3, at 262-63.
138. See Disclosure Requirements, supra note 105, at 8.
139. Id.
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and uncertain line between securities transactions requiring registration
and those exempt from registration. 40 The lack of precision frequently
imposes a heavy burden on issuers trying to comply with the law
The specific rules or guidelines which do exist often have little or noth-
ing to do with the need of investors for investment information.' 4 '
The commission's interpretation of exemption provisions appear illog-
ical with respect to the informational purpose of disclosure because its
primary concern has been protective, that is, to prevent misuse of the
exemption provisions by those with fraudulent or unethical motives. 14 2
For this reason, the commission has been adverse to laying down
specific rules for fear that such rules would simply allow unscrupulous
persons to work around them.'43 It has instead attempted to be flex-
ible in its administration of the statutes, so that it could crack down
hard on activities regarded as abuses while applying the rules some-
what differently in other cases.1 4  The resulting uncertainty, however,
has not only imposed a significant burden on legitimate issuers and
securities dealers but has come to be counterproductive in policing
fraud. In the absence of precise rules, unethical persons have been
able to mold the commission's broad interpretations to suit their own
purposes, with the commission's enforcement actions being hampered
because there is no clear violation of an established rule.145
The uncertainty and the illogicality of commission interpretations
are related to each other. Although the commission has generally been
reluctant to establish precise lines distinguishing exempt securities trans-
actions from those required to be registered, it has nonetheless often
reacted to widespread use of a particular exemption provision by pro-
mulgating quite specific rules restricting the availability of the exemp-
tion.' 46  The commission assumed that attempts to evade registration
140. Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at 1347-50.
141. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 152, 168-70, 172-74.
142. See 25 SEC ANN. REP 5 (1959); Schneider & Kant, Uncertainty Under the
Securities Act, An Open Letter to William J Casey, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 26 Bus. LAw 1623, 1635 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schneider & Kant].
Congress apparently structured the original statutory exemptions in terms of the need
for protection from fraud rather than the need of investors for information. See H.R.
REP. No. 85, supra note 14, at 7, 16 (1933) (exemptions limit bill to protection
needed to "prevent recurrences of demonstrated abuses"; exemption for stock subscrip-
tions based on absence of sales pressure).
143. Schneider & Kant, supra note 142, at 1635.
144. Id.
145. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 177; Schneider & Kant, supra note 142, at
1635.
146. See Codification Conference, supra note 3, at 836.
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requirements were generally fraudulent schemes to sell securities which
could not have been sold if full disclosure had been made.147  Be-
cause the resulting restrictive rules represented ad hoc reactions to un-
desirable practices, they appear illogical in terms of the general need of
investors for investment information.
148
For example, in the late fifties the practice developed of using
the private placement exemption to distribute unregistered securities to
the public. 149 The commission responded by tightening the rules gov-
eming resales of such private placement securities.1 50  The resulting
rules, which focused on the "investment intent" of the original pur-
chaser as evidenced by a long holding period for his securities and by
some "change of circumstances" necessitating the resale, did little to
assure that ultimate purchasers would have useful investment rnforma-
tion about the securities being sold.' 51 The rules did have some ten-
dency to deter fraudulent schemes, however, since few fraudulent pro-
moters would be willing to hold the securities for the long period needed
to prove their investment intent, and few would be able to show the
requisite change of circumstances justifying resale to the public with-
out registration.
Similarly, under Rule 133, new and restrictive resale requirements
were promulgated following a wave of attempts to utilize unregistered
mergers to distribute dubious stock to the public.15 2  Again, the new
rules did little to provide needed information to investors, but they did
hamper certain fraudulent schemes. Finally, in 1969 the commission
responded to a sudden increase in the use of spm-offs as vehicles for
selling unregistered stock, and issued a release' 5" interpreting certain
corporate spin-offs as sales requiring reigstration.154 In each case, the
commission's imposition of registration requirements was not in response
to a need for information, but was designed to restrict technical chan-
147. See 25 SEC ANN. REP. 5 (1969).
148. See, e.g., WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 168.
149. See O'Boyle, Problems of Private Placements from the Viewpoint of the
Issuer, in PLI 1ST ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 21, 22 (1970).
150. See Garrett, Concept of Restricted Securities and Eligible Insurers, in PLI 3D
ANN. INST. ON SEC. REO. 12 (1972).
151. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 168.
152. Bialkin, Corporate Acquisitions and the Securities Act of 1933, m PLI 1sT
ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 159, 161 (1970); Codification Conference, supra note 3, at
836.
153. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969).
154. SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Long, Control of the Spin-Off Device Under the Securities Act of 1933, 25 OKLA. L.
REV. 317 (1972).
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nels for legally selling unregistered stock to the public, which had be-
come deluged with fraudulent securities. Obviously, such rules can-
not seem rational if investment information is thought to be the basis
of the 1933 Act.
Summary: 1934 to the 1960's
The disclosure process developed by the commission from 1934
through the mid-sixties clearly resulted in the availability of more com-
plete, reliable information about securities and their issuers and thus
achieved much in terms of the informational purpose of disclosure. 155
The overall disclosure process, however, was significantly affected by the
continuing concern of the commission and its staff to protect the small
investor both by utilizing the disclosure process to emphasize the nega-
tive and the risk factors of securities and by using the process of ad-
ministrative review to deter fraudulent individuals and to discourage
unethical ones. Thus, the resulting disclosure process reflected
mixed motives: a desire to provide useful information, a wish to make
life difficult for irresponsible promoters, and a hope of educating the
small investor in the dangers of securities transactions.
The end product was disclosure which was less useful than it
might have been for investment analysis purposes. Accounting, the
heart of investment analysis, was left to the accountants; the commis-
sion thus lost its chance to promote comparable financial reporting.
The commission's mildly coercive tactics in connection with the ad-
ministrative review process led to the proliferation of boilerplate as
issuers and their lawyers could thus minimize the time spent in the re-
view process. 156 Pessimistic disclosure, effective in protecting inves-
tors from being misled by the unrealistic optimism of promoters, was
neither particularly informative nor entirely accurate. Finally, the com-
mission's attempts to combat fraud through uncertain rules and ad hoc
pronouncements imposed unacceptable burdens on issuers willing, but
unable, to comply with requirements which were vaguely defined and
unevenly enforced.
The Current Disclosure Process
Beginning in the mid-sixties, the commission has to some extent and
155. See Soft Information, supra note 3, at 258; Truth in Securities, supra note
3, at 1344.
156. See Letter from Carl W Schneider to Alan B. Levenson, Esq., Director, Di-
vision of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Aug. 11, 1971,
m BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. H-I (Aug. 18, 1971).
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very gradually shifted its attitude toward disclosure. The concern
with protecting the small investor from fraud, with educating him as
to the risks of speculation, and with reforming the conduct of the
securities and corporate worlds has remained, with disclosure still re-
garded as useful for these purposes. Recently, however, in order to
make disclosure more meaningfl for investment analysis purposes, the
commission has relaxed to some extent its stringent requirements that
disclosure be negative in tone and limited to "hard facts."'15 7 This in-
dicates a recognition by the commission that disclosure is most effec-
tive when used primarily for informational purposes and that direct
regulation of conduct may be the best means of deterring fraud and
undesirable practices. 58
There are a number of reasons for the change. First, the extension
of 1934 Act disclosure requirements to the over-the-counter market in
1964 vastly extended the commission's ability to provide useful invest-
ment information in connection with the trading markets, where the
bulk of securities transactions occur. As long as the 1934 Act applied
only to listed securities, the commission's disclosure authority was re-
stricted both because many issuers were not subject to its power at all
and because promulgation of stringent disclosure standards for listed
securities might have resulted in massive delisting rather than iproved
disclosure. After 1964, with disclosure mandatory for most com-
panies with a significant public interest, the commission could begin
to impose more demands. 59
Second, the demand for investment analysis information had
grown significantly as the securities markets became more specialized
and the class of professional money managers and analysts expanded.
At the same time, the demand for information from investors in-
creased as more and more individuals acquired direct or indirect in-
terests in securities of publicly owned companies. 60 Finally, the dis-
157. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5395 (June 1, 1973) (disclosure of more
meaningful information on new products, competitive position); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973) (disclosure of economic projections and forecasts); 38
SEC ANN. REP. xxv (1972); Soft Information, supra note 3, at 260.
158. For example, the commission has recently increased its attempts to curtail
undesirable selling practices by direct regulation. See SEC Securities Act Release No.
5275, at 14-16 (July 26, 1972); NASD Notice of Proposed Rules of Fair Practice to
Govern Member Conduct with Respect to Distribution of First-time Public Offerings,
March 14, 1973, m 194 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. I-1 (March 21, 1973); Address
by SEC Chairman Casey, Investment Bankers Association of America, Dec. 1, 1971, in
129 BNA SEc. REG. & L. RP. I-1, at 1-2 (December 1, 1971).
159. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 62-63.
160. See id. at 47.
closure process was increasingly criticized as burdensome and illogical,
with more attention being paid to its deficiencies than to its past accom-
plishments. 1 The commission has responded in a number of ways
both to eliminate defects in the disclosure process and to make that
process more useful for investment analysis purposes. Although many
of the commission's actions reflect a continued concern for investor pro-
tection, the overall impact is to emphasize the informational func-
tion of disclosure and to downgrade somewhat its protective role.
"Integration" of the Disclosure Statutes
The commission has recently attempted to "integrate" its disclo-
sure rules by reducing disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act, if
the issuer of the securities being sold is subject to the continuous dis-
closure requirements of the 1934 Act.1" 2 At the same time, disclo-
sure requirements under the 1934 Act have been increased and are
more stringently enforced.' 63  As discussed earlier, the prospectus dis-
closures of the 1933 Act were thought to have a significant protective
impact. Its detailed and pessimistic disclosures are actually delivered to
investors and are intended to discourage high-pressure, over-optimistic,
or misleading sales tactics associated with new issues."6 However, the
mere filing of information with the commission without delivery to
the investor does not have potential for this kind of impact, although
it makes important investment information indirectly available to the in-
vesting public. To the extent that the commission accepts 1934 Act
disclosure as a substitute for prospectus disclosure, it is foregoing some
of the protective impact of disclosure while preserving its informational
function.' 65
161. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 46, 48; Truth in Securities, supra note
3, at 1344. For a general discussion of the achievements and defects of the disclosure
process, see Codification Conference, supra note 3.
162. See Address by SEC Chairman Cook, American Society of Corporate Secretar-
ies, April 19, 1973, m CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79, 341, at 83,025 [hereinafter cited
as Address by SEC Chairman Cook]. For general discussions of integration of the two
disclosure statutes, see Heller, "Integration" of the Dissemmnation of Information Under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 749 (1964); Truth in Securities, supra note 3.
163. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5196 (Sept. 27, 1971); SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 9000 (Oct. 21, 1970); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8996 (October
14, 1970); Schneider, Developments in 1934 Act Reporting, in PLI 3D ANN. INST. ON
SEC. REG. 89, 94 (1972).
164. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
165. See H.R. REP No. 85, supra note 14, at 8 (prospectus delivery needed to
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The commission's integration actions have included limiting the
information required in a prospectus or excusing the prospectus deliv-
ery requirement altogether where the issuer of the new securities is cur-
rently making the periodic disclosures required by the 1934 Act.1 6
In addition, owners of unregistered securities acquired in private place-
ments may now resell them more readily if the issuer files 1934 Act
reports. 67 The commission has only reduced 1933 Act requirements
for seasoned securities, which evidence less need for special protection
or where special rules supply all the protection needed.168 In addi-
tion, the commission has recently increased its direct regulatory con-
trol over selling practices through more stringent enforcement of the
"suitability" and "adequate basis" rules which attempt to curtail im-
proper selling activities by directly prohibiting them. 69 The protec-
tive function of the prospectus is thus replaced to some extent by direct
regulatory control over salesmen.
Disclosure of "SofW' Information
The commission's single most significant recent action showing
its change in attitude was its announcement that projections would
"frighten" buyers and curtail selling arguments); Truth in Securities, supra note 3, at
1352-53.
166. Form S-7 has been adopted and amended to allow the use of a short-form
prospectus by certain established issuers. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5100 (Nov.
12, 1970); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4886 (Nov. 29, 1967). Form S-16 permits
use of a short-form prospectus for certain secondary offerings and rights offerings by
issuers eligible to use Form S-7. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5346 (Jan. 5, 1973);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5265A (Aug. 3, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No.
5265 (June 27, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5117 (Dec. 23, 1970); see Me-
row, Changes in 1933 Act Forms, m PLI 3D ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. at 133 (1972).
Rule 174 excuses dealers from the prospectus delivery requirement during the 40 or
90 day period after the commencement of an offering established by § 4(3) of the
1933 Act if the issuer is subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934
Act. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5101 (Nov. 19, 1970).
167. 1933 Act, SEC Rule 144(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(1) (1972); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
168. As noted, supra note 166, forms S-7 and S-16 may be used only by estab-
lished issuers and not by new enterprises which involve greater risk to investors. See
REPORT oF THE SPEcrAL STUDY OF SECURIES MARKET OF nM SECURMES AND EX-
CaANGE CoMMIssIoN, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 552-53 (dis-
closure process must be "especially refined" for new issuers); cf. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5010 (Oct. 7, 1969), at 3 ("investment conditions with respect to the com-
mon stock and the semor securities of established corporations are significantly differ-
ent, and restrictions may be relaxed. "). Rule 144 allows sales of unregistered
securities of 1934 Act issuers only in limited amounts and by unsolicited brokers' sales,
thus minimizing danger of high-pressure sales. SEC Rule 144(e), (f), 17 C.F.R. §
230.144(e), (f) (1972).
169. See authorities cited note 158 supra; 6 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 3708-27
be allowed in commission filings under certain conditions. 7 ' As dis-
cussed earlier, such "soft" information has traditionally been regarded
as manipulative per se and has been excluded from disclosure docu-
ments because of its high potential for misleading investors."7' The
information is central to sophisticated investment analysis, however.
and the commission's recent reversal in attitude indicates a willingness
to require disclosure which is highly useful even if it has some poten-
tial for misleading investors.
This is not to say that the commission is neglecting the pro-
tective aspects of disclosure in its new approach to projections. One
of the reasons for the commission's action was the desire to equalize
the access to such "soft" information by the small investor.' 2 Although
projections were not allowed in prospectuses and other documents filed
with the commission, they were circulated informally within the finan-
cial community and thus were available to insiders and institutional in-
vestors with inside sources.' 7' By allowing such information in com-
mission filings, the commission protects the small investor from com-
petitors with more accurate information.
In addition to allowing projections in required disclosures, the
commission has recently required certain disclosures which involve
"soft information," further reflecting its new attitude toward allowing
useful information even where it is not completely verifiable.174 The
commission will now require specific disclosures with respect to the
development of new products and the competitive position of the issuer
in its industry, although such information has traditionally been re-
garded as not sufficiently "hard" to be disclosed.' 7 5 Similarly, the
commission will require disclosure of compensating cash balance ar-
rangements although such arrangements are frequently informal and
170. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973); statement by SEC
Chairman Casey accompanying SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362, in [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP 79,211, at 82,665.
171. See text accompanying notes 126-130 supra.
172. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973); Address by SEC
Chairman Cook, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, April 19, 1973, in CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 79,341, at 83,026.
173. Id.
174. See Soft Information, supra note 3, at 260-61 & n.19.
175. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5395 (June 1, 1973); see Soft Information,
supra note 3, at 259 & n.12. The commission is also considering requiring first time
issuers to disclose cash budgets for future periods, a form of projection. SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972). The proposal has not yet been adopted
because of the commission's recognition that it is difficult for issuers with limited track
records and limited experience in the business to make reliable projections. SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5395 (June 1, 1973).
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therefore difficult to define with precision.1 6 Less reliability will be
accepted because the information is clearly useful to investors.
Adoption of Precise Rules
The shift in emphasis by the commission from the protective to
the informational function of disclosure is further illustrated by its re-
cent attempts to increase the clarity and certainty of the rules surround-
ing registration requirements. 177  As noted earlier, the commission
had traditionally been reluctant to lay down precise rules in these areas
because it felt that unscrupulous persons would simply work around
them.17 That policy has been criticized as placing great burdens on
the majority of ethical issuers in order to deter a few fraudulent per-
sons and as failing to promote the informational function of disclos-
ure.17 9
In response, the commission has codified and clarified its inter-
pretation of various exemptions from the registration requirements and
has indicated a general willingness to rely more on specific guidelines
and less on a case-by-case approach to particular problems.' 80 The
commi ion has proposed or adopted rules clarifying the scope of the
private placement exemption and the intrastate exemption and has clar-
ified the restrictions on the resale of securities acquired in private place-
ments.' 8 ' It has also abandoned the uncertain "no sale" theory in con-
nection with corporate combinations and has replaced it with a straight-
forward registration requirement and definite rules governing the re-
sale of securities acquired in such combinations.'8 2 By providing
"safe haven" situations in which exemptions are clearly available,
the commission has reduced its ability to crack down on fraudulent
promoters, but has lessened the burdens on legitimate issuers. In ad-
176. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5384 (April 12, 1973); see Soft Information,
supra note 3, at 255 n.3, 261 n.19.
177. See Casey, The SEC's Strategy for Increasing Investor Confidence in the In-
tegrity of our Capital Markets, 28 Bus. LAW. 537, 537-38 (1973).
178. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
179. See Schneider & Kant, supra note 142, at 1635.
180. See Casey, The SEC's Strategy for Increasing Investor Confidence in the Inte-
grity of our Capital Markets, 28 Bus. LAw. 537, 537-38 (1973); Address by SEC Chair-
man-Designate Cook, supra note 1, at 82,701.
181. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973) (proposed Rule 147 deal-
mg with intrastate offering exemption); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov.
28, 1972) (proposed Rule 146 dealing with private placement exemption); SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adopting Rule 144 providing for resale
of restricted securities).
182. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972). See generally WHEAT
REpORT, supra note 7, at 251-96.
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dition, the rules increase the investment information available to inves-
tors by requiring that all business combinations be registered and by
conditioning various securities transactions on th issuer's compliance
with 1934 Act reporting requirements.
The commission has also adopted rules defining more precisely
the information which may be released without violating the 1933 Act
when an issuer is in the process of issuing new securities. 8 ' It has
also announced that it will issue guidelines concerning the proper use
of inside information and will provide "safe haven" rules concerning
liability in connection with the use of earnings projections. 184 These
actions all involve areas in which the potential for using disclosure im-
properly is great, and in which the commission has traditionally pre-
ferred to proceed on a case-by-case basis, relying in part on uncer-
tainty to discourage improper conduct.' 85 Uncertainty in these areas,
however, has a great tendency to cut down on the flow of useful in-
vestment information. 186  Apparently recognizing this tendency, the
commission has decided to promulgate definite rules which will not
have the in terrorem effect of the case-by-case approach but which will
facilitate the free flow of information necessary for investment anal-
ysis.
The shift in the commission's attitude should not be exaggerated.
To some extent its greater willingness to promulgate specific rules
arises from the disadvantages of uncertainty in the enforcement area.
For example, there may be less risk in evading rules where their in-
terpretation is unclear because it is difficult for the commission to show
bad faith in such a case.' 87  Similarly, unethical lawyers will adivse
clients to act in violation of the "spirit" of commission's rulings where
there is no specific rule forbidding the transaction, while responsible
lawyers and issuers will comply with the spirit as well as the letter.' 8
183. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5101 (Nov. 19, 1970) (release of information
by broker-dealers concerning issuer who proposes to or has registered securities under
the 1933 Act).
184. Address by Chairman-Designate Cook, supra note 1, at 82,701 (guidelines on
inside information); Address by SEC Chairman Cook, supra note 162, at 83,026 ("safe
harbor" rule for forecasts).
185. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Impor-
tance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
691, 714-16 (1964).
186. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 127; Casey, The SEC's Strategy for In-
creasing Investor Confidence in the Integrity of our Capital Markets, 28 Bus. LAW 537,
542 (1973).
187 See SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F Supp. 943, 954 (S.D.N.Y 1971);
Schneider & Kant, supra note 142, at 1635.
188. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 177
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Therefore, the commission's shift to specific rules reflects in part the
failure of flexibility as an enforcement tool. In conjunction with other
recent commission actions, however, it also appears to indicate a greater
concern with useful disclosure than with the regulatory aspect of dis-
closure rules.
Meaningful Financial Disclosure
The final area in which the commission's actions show an in-
creased concern with information of disclosure is in financial reporting.
As discussed earlier, its traditional approach to accounting has been to
adopt the standards of the profession because they were conservative
and because delegation of accounting authority preserved its scarce
resources for more important fields. More recently, however,
the commission has emphasized the investment analysis function of
disclosure by requiring financial disclosures which are more comparable
and more informative about the quality of earnings and the "economic
realities" of an enterprise.'89
Issuers must now disclose the effect of choosing among various
acceptable accounting methods and must indicate any change in ac-
counting principles and its impact on their financial statements. 190 By
increasing the comparability of financial statements, these require-
ments will markedly improve their usefulness for investment analysis
purposes. Other new disclosure requirements are intended to show
the "quality of earnings" of an issuer. The effect of tax elections on
financial statements must be revealed.' 9 ' The nature of unusual
charges or credits to income must be disclosed, and, as the commis-
sion has proposed, timely disclosure must be made when significant
charges to income appear likely in the near future. 92  As noted ear-
lier, the impact of compensating balance arrangements must be dis-
closed, and lease financing terms must be revealed in greater detail. 9 3
189. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5342 (Dec. 18, 1972); statement of SEC
Chairman Casey accompanying Release No. 5342 m CCH FF_. SEC. L. REP'. f 79,144,
at 82,476-77; Address by SEC Chairman Casey, New York Financial Writers' Associa-
tion, June 7, 1971, m 105 DNA SEC. REG. & L. RPP. F-I, at F-I, F-2 (June 9, 1971).
190. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5343 (Dec. 18, 1972); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5342 (Dec. 18, 1972); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9344
(Sept. 27, 1971).
191. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5344 (Dec. 18, 1972).
192. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5313 (Oct. 2, 1972); Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9345 (Sept. 27, 1971).
193. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5401 (June 6, 1973); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5384A (Apr. 27, 1973); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5384 (Apr. 12,
1973).
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Sales and earnings must be broken down by lines of business, and a
statement of the sources and application of funds must be included.' 9
In addition, the optional inclusion of earnings projections will make
required disclosure documents much more useful.' 95
Most of the recent disclosure requirements result from increased
sensitivity to the information needs of sophisticated investors and pro-
fessional analysts, not those of average investors who are unable to use
most of the new disclosure without professional assistance.' 96 The new
disclosure requirements are thus chiefly designed to serve an informa-
tional purpose.
The commission has not neglected the protective aspects of disclo-
sure, however, even in the area of financial disclosure. The newly
required disclosures about accounting policies not only serve a useful
informational purpose by increasing the comparability of financial state-
ments, but also deter manipulative accounting and serve indirectly to
warn investors about the flexible nature of accounting methods. 9 7  In
addition, the commission has recently issued a release in which it spe-
cifically warns issuers disclosing cash flow as well as net income that
cash flow disclosures may "mislead the unsophisticated" and should
only be used in certain circumstances and with proper qualifications. 98
Nevertheless, most of the commission's recent actions are clearly
designed to enable professionals to perform better their investment
analysis and investment advice function. The commission has recog-
nized that it is difficult for the average investor to make an "informed
194. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5135 (Feb. 26, 1971); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
195. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973).
196. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, at 4 (July 26, 1972) (disclosure
efficacious only when properly verified and used by professionals); Address by SEC
Chairman Cook, supra note 162, at 83,027 (financial analysts important in disseminating
information to investing public); cf. Address by SEC Chairman Cook, N.Y Society of
Security Analysts, March 27, 1973, in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP 79,301, at 82,914 (com-
mission responsible for providing adequate information for sophisticated professional
analysts).
197 Choices among acceptable methods of accounting can be and have been used
to obscure rather than reveal the economic realities of an enterprise. Statement by
SEC Chairman Casey accompanying SEC Securities Act Release No. 5342, in [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,144, at 82,476 (Dec. 18, 1972). More
disclosure about accounting methods will educate the public as to the potentially ma-
nipulative aspects of accounting and undercut the public's impression that accounting
techniques result in exact measurements rather than estimates. See Address by SEC
Chairman Casey, Annual Meeting of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
in 171 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-I (Oct. 4, 1972).
198. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5377 (March 15, 1973).
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investment decision" without professional assistance. 19 9 Just as "inte-
gration" of 1933 and 1934 Act disclosure has reduced physical deliv-
ery of information to the average investor, so the reformation dis-
closed is increasingly aimed at the professional, with only an indirect
benefit to the average investor.
200
The Readable Prospectus
In one respect, however, the commission's recent activities in the
disclosure area strongly reflect a continued concern with the protec-
tive function of disclosure. Throughout its history, the commission
has tried to make the prospectus "readable" to the average investor;
20 1
it has recognized that the complex and detailed information required
to assure "full" disclosure is incomprehensible and confusing to the
average investor.20 2 There is thus an inherent conflict between "full'
disclosure useful to the sophisticated investor and "fair" disclosure
which presents a comprehensible picture of the enterprise to the aver-
age investor.20 3 The latter type of disclosure is necessary if the pros-
pectus is to serve its protective function by warning the investor of
the negative factors involved in an enterprise and by providing the
investor with reliable information.
The commission has consistently urged issuers to reduce the
length and complexity of prospectuses and to avoid technical or legal
jargon.20 1  In this connection, it has recently required that each pros-
pectus contain a summary of its contents noting the salient features of
the offering.20 5 Such summaries had been required in complex pro-
spectuses and merger proxy statements prior to the recent adoption of
the formal guideline.208 Use of such a summary has been criticized
by commentators who ask how summary disclosure can be considered
adequate if, in fact, great detail is required for full disclosure.20 7 The
199. See authorities cited note 196, supra.
200. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 52.
201. See 1933 Act, SEC Rule 460(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.460(f) (1954); 4 SEC ANN.
REP. 46 (1938); 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 261-65.
202. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 52; see Heller, Disclosure Requirements Un-
der Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAw. 300, 301-02 n.6 (1961).
203. See Myths, supra note 3, at 1165.
204. See Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, SEC Secun-
ties Act Release No. 4936 at 1 5 (Dec. 9, 1968); 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 261-
65; WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 77-81.
205. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5396 (June 1, 1973).
206. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5231 (Feb. 3, 1972) (include readable
summary II lengthy or complex prospectuses); Smith, An Overview of the Registration
Statement Process, m GOING PuBLIc: FrLING PROBLEMS 3, 9 (J. McCord ed. 1970).
207. Myths, supra note 3, at 1165.
answer to such criticism is that summaries are not designed to inform
the investor thoroughly about the enterprise but are simply intended
to give him some idea of the essentials so that he can assess oral sales
promises or detect blatant kinds of unfairness in the security 208 In
other words, such summaries may not enable the investor to make a
reasoned choice among competing investments, but can prevent him
from buying a bad security Summaries thus serve the same func-
tion as pessimistic disclosure and conservative accounting practices.
The commission has also recently required the inclusion of pie-
charts and bar graphs in prospectuses to represent in graphic terms the
dilution of the investor's equity resulting from the offering, the pro-
moters' investment as compared to that of the public investors, and
the use of proceeds.2" 9 This development has also been criticized as
not adding anything to the informational function of prospectuses.21 °
Clearly, however, the purpose of the graphic disclosures is not to con-
vey additional information, but simply to underline for investors the
possible negative aspects of the investment."' In other words, the
prospectus is designed to emphasize those negative aspects of the in-
vestment which might be sloughed over by an eager salesman..2 12  Such
disclosure devices are aimed not at the sophisticated prospectus reader,
but at the average reader, and they are designed not to inform but to
warn. They are modern supplements to the prominent description of
risk factors which the commission has traditionally required to be in-
cluded in prospectuses for speculative securities.7 3
208. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 677 (4th ed.
1962).
209. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 (July 26, 1972).
210. Neiw Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus.
LAW. 505, 528 (1973) (remarks of H. Marsh); see Kripke, The Myth of the Informed
Layman, 28 Bus. LAw 631, 633-34 (1973).
211. Cf. Letter from Carl W Schneider to Alan B. Levenson, Esq., Director, Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Aug. 11, 1971, in
BNA SEC. REG. L &. REP H-I, H-2 (Aug. 18, 1971)
"A prospectus with a "dilution" paragraph bears a stigma. It clearly suggests to
the public that a certain adverse evaluation has been made, since the dilution presenta-
tion is very rarely given for a seasoned stock."
212. A similar purpose apparently underlies the recent requirement that notes to
financial statements be printed in larger type than heretofore required; the release pro-
posing the rule emphasized the crucial financial information is often disclosed in the
notes in fine print which is apt to be overlooked by investors. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5145 (Apr. 30, 1971) (adopting rule); SEC Securities Act Release No.
5112 (Nov. 23, 1970) (proposing rule).
213. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, at 6 (Dec. 9, 1968); authorities
cited note 132 supra.
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The commission's persistent concern with the "readable" pro-
spectus is to some extent inconsistent with its recent apparent shift
toward more informative and less protective disclosure. In part, of
course, attempts to make prospectuses more readable benefit sophis-
ticated as well as average investors. Recent attempts to eliminate
boilerplate and to discourage verbosity are designed to make the pro-
spectus more useful to all readers, whether naive or sophisticated.21 4
The inclusion of pictorial disclosures and the emphasis on risk factors
and negative aspects of the investment, however, are inconsistent with
recent commission attempts to provide disclosure useful primarily to
sophisticated investors for investment analysis purposes. Such actions
can only be explained by the commission's belief that disclosure can
continue to be an effective protective device for the average investor.
It appears to be generally conceded that disclosure alone is not
enough to prevent investors from buying highly risky or even worth-
less securities during bull markets.215 Yet the commission's words
and actions seem to indicate hope that disclosure can do even that.
One may speculate that the commitment to the readable prospectus
may be as much a matter of faith that the average man can be per-
suaded to act rationally if enough attempts of persuasion are made as
it is a practical means of promoting more honest securities markets.210
Conclusion
The commission's administration of the disclosure provisions of
the federal securities laws suggests that it historically has viewed the
protection of the unsophisticated investor as its primary job; the pro-
viding of useful investment information in order to promote efficient
securities markets has to some extent been subordinated to the former
task. Recently, however, as the securities markets have become
more complicated and the relative importance of professional analysts
and money managers has increased, the commission has responded by
focusing more on the provision of useful information and less on the
necessity of utilizing disclosure to protect the unwary investor against
bad investments.
214. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5396 (June 1, 1973); Address by SEC
Chairman-Designate Cook, supra note 1, at 82,700.
215. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MscH. L. REv. 607,
616 (1964); Levenson, The Role of the SEC As a Consumer Protection Agency, 27
Bus. LAw. 61, 62-63 (1971).
216. See Sommer, Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Protection, 27
Bus. LAW. 85, 88 (1971).
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Nevertheless, the commission has not abandoned its protective
role; its increased activities in the direct regulation of securities dealers
indicates its realization that disclosure may be less effective than direct
regulation in protecting investors. The commission's commitment to
disclosure as a protective device is a longstanding one, however, and its
maintained concern with such issues as the readable prospectus suggests
the continuation of that commitment.
